Graham's fresh consideration of the Presocratic discovery that the moon derives its light from the sun. After a careful study of the evidence, he comes to a conclusion many have reached before: the credit almost certainly belongs to Parmenides. What is distinctive about Graham's discussion is his eloquence in making the case for Parmenides as 'un cosmologiste formidable, ainsi que ses successeurs l'ont reconnu lorsqu' ils ont adopté son intuition fondamentale et l'ont exploité pour en dériver un modèle des corps célestes physiquement puissant' (as this quotation indicates, many of the contributions originally written in English have been translated into French). He ends with the claim that Parmenides' perception that the moon is a solid, opaque, spherical body, circling the earth beneath the sun, was perhaps the decisive moment in early Greek astronomy, enabling the eventual development of a mathematical model of the heavens such as the Babylonians (for want of an underlying physical model) never achieved.
Preus's book is the sixth volume in a series dedicated to ancient Greek philosophy. The book includes eleven essays, some of which make use of illustrations, maps, and µgures. It also makes available an index of concepts and classical passages cited mostly from the Diels-Kranz collection of Presocratic fragments. In his introduction to the book, P. informs us that all of the essays have been, at one time or another, presented at the meetings of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. The book explores topics in classical scholarship such as the importance of Anaximander's scientiµc views, the influence of the Presocratics on Plato's philosophy, and the impossibility of motion in Eleatic philosophy. In what follows, I present the main argument of each of the essays in an abbreviated form.
The essays by G. Naddaf, D. L. Couprie, and R. McKirahan focus on the scientiµc aspects of Anaximander's philosophical investigations. In 'Anaximander's Measurements Revisited', Naddaf argues that to settle the debate surrounding the numbers and/or measurements regarding Anaximander's cosmological model we need to understand that 'Anaximander appears obsessed with units of 3 and not with units of 4' (p. 8). In doing so, Naddaf demonstrates that Anaximander holds a 'mathematical or geometrical' view of the universe (p. 19). In a similar manner, Couprie credits Anaximander with being the 'discoverer of space ' (p. 24) . He argues that not only does Western astronomy begin with Anaximander, but also that Anaximander was revolutionary in his thinking by providing us with the µrst 'three-dimensional world-picture' of the universe (p. 48). In ' Anaximander's Inµnite Worlds', McKirahan associates Anaximander with those who believe in an Inµnite Universe. Although McKirahan ultimately favors the view that Anaximander's inµnite worlds are coexistent, he shows that a more nuanced and careful appreciation of that theory makes Anaximander's thought more intricate and worthy of appreciation than commonly assumed.
In his 1869-70 lectures on the Preplatonic philosophers, Nietzsche writes, 'Plato is the µrst grand mixed character both in his philosophy and in his philosophical typology. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements unite in his theory of the Ideas; it should not, without further qualiµcation, be called an original conception' (F. Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, trans. G. Whitlock [Chicago, 2000] , p. 1). Nietzsche acknowledges what C. Hu ¶man attempts to prove in his piece 'The Philolaic Method: The Pythagoreanism Behind the Philebus'. Hu ¶man argues that the residue of Pythagoreanism is on display in Plato's Philebus. Speciµcally, he argues that Plato's Philebus makes use of the µfth-century Pythagorean Philolaus' belief that there are limiters and unlimiteds and when these are bounded together and expressed mathematically they reveal the truth concerning reality.
As P. states in the introduction, W. I. Matson, J. Wilcox, and I. M. Bodnár examine 'early Greek views of natural process' (p. 2). Matson advocates the minority view, contrary to what he calls the majority view (i.e. that the Eleatic philosophers denied that motion was possible), that Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus did not deny the possibility of motion, but rather ascribed this position to their opponents. Wilcox's '"Whole-Natured Forms" in Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle' provides an analysis of Empedoclean Love and Strife to support his argument that Empedocles' cosmic cycle is symmetrical. Bodnár's 'Atomic Independence and Indivisibility' provides an overview of Epicurean atomism explaining why 'the atomists lacked a credible and comprehensive theory of atomic immutability' (p. 123).
The last four essays, Preus tells us, discuss '"the useful virtues and politics" as those issues were understood in the days of Socrates' (p. 3). We learn from P. Curd 'Why Democritus Was Not a Skeptic'. M. Gagarin's 'The Truth of Antiphon's Truth' claims that Antiphon holds a view of truth that originates with Hesiod. T. M. Robinson attempts to elucidate the aim and meaning of Sextus Empiricus' Dissoi Logoi. C. S. Gould contends not only that Sophocles' Philoctetes is a work of serious philosophical merit, but also that the play 'anticipates a model of virtue' found in Plato 's Republic (p. 199) .
Although the evidence supporting the claims in these essays is hardly welldocumented in some cases and speculative at best in others, the contributors to this volume remind us of the enduring signiµcance of what Plato's predecessors had to teach him and what they can still impart to us. In the recently revived and continuing interest in Orphic literature, this volume has a
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